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A Data-driven, Falsification-based Model of Human Driver Behavior
Nauman Sohani∗, Geunseob (GS) Oh∗, Xinpeng Wang
Abstract— We propose a novel framework to differentiate
between vehicle trajectories originating from human and non-
human drivers by constructing a data-driven boundary using
parametric signal temporal logic (STL). Such construction
allows us to evaluate the trajectories, detect rare-events, and
reduce the uncertainty of driver behaviors when it assumes
the form of a disturbance in control synthesis and evaluation
problems. We train a classifier that separates admissible (i.e.
human) examples - which arise from real-world demonstrations
- and inadmissible (i.e. non-human) examples that are generated
by falsifying specifications synthesized from the same real-world
driving data. Proceeding in this fashion allows for finding a
reasonable boundary of human behaviors exhibited in real-
world driving records. The framework is demonstrated using
a case study involving a human-driven vehicle approaching a
signalized intersection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of human driver research has received significant
attention, in part due to its relevance to connected and
automated vehicles (CAVs) and subsequent problems of path-
planning and control synthesis. Consequently, there is a
significant body of research in the field of modeling human
driver behavior that has leveraged different techniques, such
as dynamic system modeling [1]; neural networks [2], [3];
stochastic processes [4]; and inverse reinforcement learning
[5]. Much of the prior work in the field has focused on
predicting likely actions based on inference from driver
studies or real-world observations of human drivers. Unfor-
tunately, “interesting” edge cases are rare events and may
not be explicitly captured or reproduced in the aforemen-
tioned approaches. Therefore, we advocate a mapping as in
[6], which leverages real-world driving data to construct a
realistic set of trajectories which accommodate the reactive
and uncertain nature of human drivers. Such a method can
be extended to evaluating controllers by sampling rare, (and
likely dangerous) events.
In contrast to the differential game setting of [6], we
instead generate examples of non-human behaviors using
falsification. The literature on cyberphysical system veri-
fication is substantial, and several mature toolboxes have
been developed to address the falsification problem [7], [8].
Furthermore, recent literature has addressed the synthesis
of precise specifications by considering template formulae
and searching for the range of parameters for which these
formulae are falsified [9], or satisfied [10] by a given system.
Herein, parameter synthesis is used to precisely describe
human driver behavior by studying real-world examples; then
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falsifying these rules generates possible non-human actions.
The observed and generated examples are subsequently used
in the construction of a classifier.
Such an approach has consequences for control synthesis
and evaluation. Given a state-dependent description of human
driver behavior, we can compute special sets of interest,
such as initial conditions from which a human disturbance
can initiate collisions. Such scenarios are instructive to test
the robustness of a path-planner or a controller. There are
philosophical similarities between this strategy and the work
developed in [11].
Motivated by [3] and [12], we demonstrate the proposed
framework on a case study of a human-driven vehicle (HV)
approaching a signalized intersection. In this setting, the
leading HV plays the role of a disturbance signal to the
following controlled vehicle, which desires a safe, fuel-
optimal policy. Our objective is to obtain a set-valued, state-
dependent mapping that describes human actions using the
aforementioned classification approach; such a mapping can
be conceived as a driver model, which can be utilized for
synthesizing a fuel-optimal safe controller as in [12]. In the
absence of such a mapping, we may resort to a worst-case
approach based only on the physical limitations of a given
situation or one of the aforementioned probabilistic methods.
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following
way: Section II gives an overview of the problem under study
including a hybrid system formulation, summary of real-
world driving data, and a preview of the solution approach.
Section III summarizes the key mathematical tools that are
leveraged to solve the problem. Section IV consolidates
the methods and tools of Section III to detail the solution
approach alluded to in Section II. Section V discusses results
and practical considerations when using the methods of
Section III. Section VI offers concluding remarks and plans
for future work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The objective of this work is to systematically deter-
mine a set-valued, state-dependent bound on human driving
behavior. Given potential applications of our framework,
this approach considers only longitudinal dynamics of a
leading vehicle. Furthermore, we reason that while a driver
is unlikely to modify his or her behavior based on the actions
of a trailing vehicle, the behavior will be affected by other
factors such as the state of a traffic light or length of the
vehicle queue already formed at an intersection [3]. We make
the following assumptions on the motion of the HV: (1)
The HV passes through the intersection, i.e. no left/right
turning actions; (2) The HV does not change lanes; (3) The
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Qty. Description Type Range
dx Distance to intersection Continuous state [0, d]
vx Velocity Continuous state [0, v]
tel Time since last sT L change Continuous state [0, ∞)
lq Traffic queue at intersection Continuous state [0, dx]
sT L State of traffic light Discrete state {G,Y,R}
u(t) Acceleration Input [a,a]
TABLE I: Summary of important quantities of Σ
acceleration of the HV is only determined by a short history
of the state of traffic light its own kinematics.
Formally, the problem can be stated as the construction of
a mapping from a sequence of the states to an admissible
subset of the acceleration input of HV at the next time
instance:
f :
t=t0
∏
t=t0−h
X −→ 2U .
A. System Model
We represent the model of [3] as a hybrid system, Σ, as
represented in Figure 1. Relevant quantities of Σ are sum-
marized in Table I. In this study, the signal light will cycle
through the different colors on a fixed schedule reflecting
the most frequent values of signal phasing and timing data
from the SPMD database (c.f. Section II-B). Among the four
continuous states, the estimated length of queue formed at
the intersection, lq, will be 0 during green and yellow lights,
and estimated by a constant value on red light.
Fig. 1: Hybrid automaton representation of Σ
B. Overview of Real-World Driving Data
The human driving data were collected from the Safety
Pilot Model Deployment (SPMD), a large-scale connected
vehicle study conducted in the Ann Arbor, MI area [13].
It contains records on the driving patterns and behaviors
of 2,842 equipped vehicles in Michigan. For this project,
556 eastbound trajectories from three weeks in 2014 were
extracted from the database and synchronized with V2X
communication units installed at the Fuller-Bonisteel inter-
section (map available at: https://www.google.com/
maps/@42.2873631,-83.7196829,19z).
C. Overview of Proposed Method
The problem of constructing a state-dependent set of HV
acceleration inputs is framed as finding a boundary between
human and non-human driving behavior, and subsequently
translated into one of classifications. SPMD provides exam-
ples of human driving traces, i.e. positive examples for the
classification; on the other hand, generating negative training
examples for the classification problem, i.e. the driving traces
that are “non-human”, is less straightforward.
The fundamental assumption of our framework is that HVs
will satisfy certain specifications representing traffic rules,
driving norms, etc. We attempt to capture these specifications
using a set of Parametric Signal Temporal Logic (PSTL) for-
mulae. A feasible parameter set for these PSTL formulae is
synthesized from analysis of real-world (naturalistic) driving
data; the boundary of the parameter set is used to convert
PSTL formulae to STL formulae. Then falsifications of the
STL formulae represent violations of the traffic rules that
humans are assumed to satisfy. Consequently, such violations
constitute negative training examples for the classifier. The
mapping to human driver actions then corresponds to those
actions for which the state-action tuple is classified as
“human” behavior.
III. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
Central to this approach is the construction of precise
specifications that represent human driver behavior and sub-
sequent classification of state-action tuples as “human” or
“non-human”. In the following, we give a brief overview of
the mathematical tools employed in this framework. More
details can be found in [14] and [15]. The interplay between
the tools used to achieve our objective will be described in
more detail in Section IV.
A. Parametric Signal Temporal Logic
PSTL builds upon STL, which considers real-valued predi-
cates over a real-valued time domain [16]. STL specifications
can be conceived as constraints on a signal, x(t) :R+→Rn,
as it evolves over time. Such a constraint can be captured by
inequalities, called predicates µ of the form µ := f (x(t))≥ pi ,
where pi ∈ R. The syntax for building specifications can be
defined inductively as:
φ :=> | µpi | ¬φ | φ ∧ψ | φU[τ1,τ2]ψ
where the subscript of µpi is used to emphasize the de-
pendence of the predicate on the parameter pi . The main
distinction between STL formulae and PSTL formulae is
that in the latter, some of the parameters, which include the
scale parameter pi , and time parameters τ1 and τ2, are left
unspecified. The semantics of (P)STL formulae are given as:
x(t) |= µpi ⇔ f (x(t))≥ pi
x(t) |= ¬µpi ⇔ f (x(t))< pi
x(t) |= φ ∧ψ ⇔ x(t) |= φ and x |= ψ
x(t) |= φU[τ1,τ2]ψ ⇔ ∃t ′ ∈ [t+ τ1, t+ τ2] : x(t ′) |= ψ
and ∀t ′′ ∈ [t, t ′] : x(t) |= φ .
In the following, we also consider the temporal operators
always and eventually:
♦[τ1,τ2]φ := >U[τ1,τ2]φ
[τ1,τ2]φ := ¬(♦[τ1,τ2]¬(φ)).
Due to the continuous nature of the (P)STL predicate,
Boolean satisfaction can be refined to consider the degree
to which a signal satisfies a specification. This is done using
a robustness metric ρ(φ ,x(t)), which induces the following
quantitative semantics:
ρ(µpi ,x(t)) = f (x(t))−pi
ρ(¬φ ,x(t)) = −ρ(φ ,x(t))
ρ(φ ,ψ,x(t)) = min(ρ(φ ,x(t)),ρ(ψ,x(t)))
ρ(φU[τ1,τ2]ψ,x(t)) = supt ′∈[t+τ1,t+τ2](min(ρ(ψ,x(t)),
inft ′′∈[t,t ′](ρ(φ ,x(t))))
The positive (or negative) sense of ρ(φ ,x(t)) captures
Boolean satisfaction (or violation) of the specification, and
the absolute value captures the robustness with which the
signal satisfies (or violates) the specification.
B. Parameter Synthesis
The parameter synthesis problem is one of finding the set
of parameters which result in tight satisfaction of a PSTL
specification by signals. In particular, we consider specifica-
tions ρ(φ ,x(t)) where monotonically increases or decreases
with a specific parameter. For such problems, parameter
synthesis can be reduced to a generalized binary search [14],
[10]. For this work, we use the methods developed and
implemented in the BREACH toolbox [8].
C. Falsification
The falsification problem can be thought of as dual to that
of parameter synthesis. The objective of this problem is to
find an input signal which results in the violation of a given
specification. In [10], this is formulated as an optimization
problem on ρ(φ ,x(t)) over input signals u(t):
minimize ρ(φ(p),Σ(u(t)))
s.t. u(t) ∈U
p ∈P.
A negative ρ?, which is the solution to this program, in-
dicates a specification violation and the pair (x(t),u(t)) is
referred to as a counterexample. In general, the falsification
problem is undecidable, and the BREACH toolbox may not
find a counterexample even if one exists; this feature is re-
flected in the general non-linear structure of the optimization
program.
D. Classification
The classification problem seeks to identify boundaries
between distinct classes given labeled examples of valid class
members. In this work, we operate on time-series of the
state and control input, X(t) = [x(t),u(t)], and check for
membership in the aforementioned classes.
The former can be modeled using a feed-forward neural
network (or multi-layer perceptron, MLP), and the latter
using a recurrent neural network (RNN) (Figure 2). The MLP
is a generic non-linear function approximator and is widely
used for regression and classification; however, it is best
equipped to handle only instantaneous snapshots of a time-
series. On the other hand, RNN is a class of artificial neural
(a) Feed-forward Neural Net-
work Classifier
(b) Recurrent Neural Network
Classifier
Fig. 2: Two classifiers are used to classify “human” traces
from “non-human” traces
networks where connections between nodes form a directed
graph along a sequence. This allows for incorporating the
temporal dynamic behavior of a time sequence. Unlike feed-
forward neural networks, RNN can use their internal hidden
units to process sequences of inputs.
In this project, we demonstrate both methods of classifi-
cation and compare the performance of the two classifiers.
The output can be either modeled using a binary variable
y(t) ∈ 0,1 (where 0 indicates “non-human”, and 1 indicates
“human”) or using two distinct variables y(t) = [pnH , pH ]T
where pnH ∈ [0,1] and pH ∈ [0,1] indicate the probability
of the given trace to be non-human and human, respectively.
Note that ∑(yi(t))= 1. In this work, we will use the notion of
the output that is most convenient in the relevant discussion.
IV. SOLUTION APPROACH
As described in Section II, the goal is to construct a set of
driver inputs given a finite history of the states and inputs,
f (x(t0−h), ...,x(t0),u(t0−h), ...,u(t0−1)) = [u(t0),u(t0)].
(1)
In our solution, we will consider 3-second intervals con-
sisting of tuples of the state and control input. Suppose the
classifier takes the form
g(x(t0−h), ...,x(t0),u(t0−h), ...,u(t0)) = g(x¯, u¯)
and maps arguments to the real numbers. In this setting, a
positive value implies that the tuple is an example of human
behavior and a negative value implies that the tuple is an
example of non-human behavior. Hence, the boundary of
human behavior is the set of tuples (x¯, u¯) for which the
classifier evaluates to zero:
Xboundary = {(x¯, u¯) | g(x¯, u¯) = 0}
(Note: this approach can be adapted for classifiers which
produce an output in [0,1]2, i.e. expressing the probability
of an input tuple belonging to either class, by finding the set
of tuples for which the output is [0.5,0.5]T .)
Given the classifier, g, the set-valued driver behavior
mapping, f , can be defined as f (x¯) = [u,u] ⊆ [a,a] where
the lower limit, u(t0), is found from (1):
u(t0) = min{u(t0) | (x¯, u¯) ∈ Xboundary}
In practice, we seek a compact set to represent the range of
inputs as in (1). Moreover, from the perspective of control
synthesis treating the driver as a disturbance for our case
study, we are interested in the lower limit of the human
acceleration. Therefore, one method may be to initiate a root-
finding routine for g initialized at the lowest acceleration
permissible by the road friction. These details are explored
in more detail in Section V.
The selection of negative training examples for classifi-
cation requires actions which no human would undertake
given the state. In order to generate such examples, we posit
that humans generally satisfy a set of specifications; then
violations of these specifications are candidates for negative
training examples. In this study, we consider linear-time
properties representing traffic rules. While not every violation
of a traffic rule constitutes non-human behavior, we argue
that violation of traffic rules is a necessary condition for non-
human behavior. The basis for counterexample generation
then is falsification of specifications that human drivers
satisfy. The problem of creating precise specifications for
subsequent falsification is posed as one of parameter synthe-
sis where the template reflects some traffic rule. Note that
this is a different flavor from the requirement mining methods
of [10]: Jin et al. developed a framework to synthesize the
requirements to which legacy controllers were developed for
subsequent analysis (possibly using formal methods). On the
contrary, in this work, the controller under study is the human
driver itself, and the falsifier becomes a proxy for “non-
human” behavior.
It is reasonable to ask whether the synthesized set of
specifications itself can be used to define the boundary of
human driver behavior. We argue that such a method may
encounter the following issues: (1) the set of specifications
would have to be “complete” in some sense, i.e. it should
represent all the rules that human drivers follow; (2) we
argue that violation of traffic rules is a necessary condition
for identifying non-human behavior but it is not sufficient:
hence there may be examples of violating behavior that is
valid human behavior. In brief, the authors are not aware of
methods to quantify the quality of the set of specifications
but this may be possible with a classification approach as
described in Section VI.
The overall work-flow is described in the context of Figure
3. Red boxes represent inputs; these are traces of human
driver behavior, specification templates representing driver
behavior in the form of PSTL formulae, and a dynamical
model in Simulink with an interface to BREACH. The traces
and PSTL formulae are inputs to the parameter synthesis
problem. The output of this block is a set of feasible
parameters for a given specification. The feasible parameter
set and specifications are considered in the falsification
problem wherein we seek a control signal to violate the
specification; consequently the falsifier is a proxy for a non-
human driver. These negative training examples are com-
bined with the positive training examples used for parameter
synthesis in the classification block wherein we seek the
aforementioned function g. Finally f is obtained through
X+: traces of
human driver
behavior
Parameter
synthesis
Φ: PSTL
representations
of traffic rules
Counterexample
generation using
falsification
Σ: dynamical
model
Classification
f (·): driver
behavior model
P(φ), ∀φ ∈Φ
X−
g(x,u)
Fig. 3: Description of solution approach
g using the querying process described above. The first
two blue blocks corresponding to parameter synthesis and
falsification are treated separately from the last blue block
corresponding to classification. Some iteration between the
two, i.e. sampling traces belonging to the “human driver”
class and including these in X+ for subsequent classifier
construction, may be considered in future work - this is
discussed in more detail in Section VI. A counterexample
generation strategy corresponding to the first two blue blocks
is described in Algorithm 1. The reason for controlling the
initial condition for subsequent falsification is to obtain good
coverage and diversity in the falsifying traces. Note that we
applied slight modifications to this routine. For clarity, these
were omitted in the presentation of Algorithm 1 - details are
discussed in Section V.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Driver Behavior as PSTL Formulae
Following the framework of Section IV, we construct a
collection of specifications in PSTL to represent traffic rules
or common sense driving norms. A simple example of this
is a specification on speed limit: “never exceed speed limit”.
Algorithm 1: COUNTEREXAMPLE GENERATION
Data: Traces of driver behavior: X+; State space
discretization: X0; PSTL formulae: Φ;
Dynamical model: Σ
Result: Falsifying traces: X− = {(x0,u0, ..., ,xN ,uN) :
∃φ ∈Φ,∃p ∈P(φ),∃x0 ∈X0, such that
ξu0,...,uN−1(x0) 6|= φ(p)}
1 P ← /0; X−← /0;
2 forall φ ∈Φ do
// Parameter synthesis [14]
3 P(φ) = FINDPARAM(X+,φ)
4 forall p ∈P(φ) do
// Falsification [10]
5 forall x0 ∈X0 do
6 X ′ = FALSIFYALGO(Σ(x0),φ(p))
7 X−← X−∪X ′
8 end
9 end
10 end
While this technically represents a traffic rule, a higher
priority traffic norm is to travel with the flow of traffic;
therefore, human drivers typically exceed the posted speed
limit by some margin. Consequently, we synthesize a PSTL
specification based on the traffic rule and parameterize the
true speed limit to accommodate following traffic norms:
φvlimit (ν) =[0,T ](vx < ν). (2)
Aside from rules such as (2), we investigate how driver
behaviors vary based on the state of the traffic light. Essen-
tially, this translates into modeling the driver as a switched
system where we seek to learn the behavior rules in each
traffic light state. Herein, we formulate a PSTL formula for
each traffic light state based on a basic traffic rule activated
by that particular traffic light state. In (2) and in subsequent
specifications, T is the length of the human driver trajectory.
At a green light, a vehicle should move fast enough to
avoid blocking traffic:
φG(δ ,τ,ν) =[0,T ](((sT L(t) = G)
∧(dx(t)> δ )∧ (tel(t)> τ))→ (vx(t)> ν)) (3)
Intuition: If the traffic light has been green “for some time”,
and one is “sufficiently far” from the intersection, then one
should “not drive too slowly”. All expressions in quotation
marks are represented as parameters in the PSTL formula.
At a yellow light, vehicles may decide to pass or stop:
φY (δ ,ν0,ν) =[0,T ]((sT L(t) = Y )∧ (dx(t)> δ )
∧(vx(0)> ν0)∧ (tel(t)> 0.5)→[0,3](vx(t)> ν)) (4)
Intuition: Based on the vehicle speed and distance to the
intersection, if one “recognizes” a yellow light, then one must
decide to pass or stop. In reality, the decision is determined
by whether the driver perceives dx to be larger than her
accepted/anticipated stopping distance at current speed. If
so, the driver will stop.
At a red light, a vehicle should never cross the intersection:
φR(δ ,τ,ν) =[0,T ]((sT L(t) = R)∧ (dx(t)> δ )
∧(tel(t)> τ)−→ (vx(t)< ν)) (5)
Intuition: If the traffic light has been red “for some time”
and one is “close” to the intersection, then one should “drive
slowly”.
B. Parameter Synthesis Results
The parameter synthesis module of BREACH was applied
to find the feasibility domain for (2), (3), (4), and (5). In order
to exploit BREACH’s binary-search solver for monotonic
specifications, we implement an alternation scheme for PSTL
formulae with multiple parameters; we found the results to
be consistent regardless of the order of alternation.
For the speed limit specification (2), the result of parame-
ter synthesis found the feasible parameter set to be all speeds
less than 25.5 m/s. Observe that this is about 60% over the
posted speed limit of 15.6 m/s (35 mph).
For the remaining specifications, we found a multi-
dimensional Pareto frontier to represent the boundary of the
feasible parameter set as in [10], [14]. These frontiers are
illustrated in Figure 4.
C. Falsification Results
The falsification routine as described in Section III-C
requires a parameter set, P; hence we sample parameters
from the Pareto frontier in Figure 4 in order to ensure we
obtain good coverage and diversity in the falsifying traces.
The falsification problem requires classes of input sig-
nals, which are used together with a dynamical model to
create falsifying traces. In this work, we consider piece-
wise constant signals of duration 0.5 seconds; during each
constant segment, the input can assume a value within the
set U = [−6,3] m/s2. The simulation horizon is three seconds
and thus the input signal contains six control points.
Figure 5a illustrates a falsifying trajectory of the red light
specification
φR(19.5,7.5,10) =[0,T ]((sT L(t) = R)∧ (dx(t)< 19.5)
∧(tel(t)> 7.5)→ (vx(t)< 10)).
Here, the HV simply maintains its speed when approaching
the intersection, and thus violates the spec on “HV should
lower its speed as it approaches the intersection”. Figure 5b
shows the robust satisfaction of
(sT L(t) = R)∧ (dx(t)< 19.5)∧ (tel(t)> 7.5)→ (vx(t)< 10)
which is the portion of φR(19.5,7.5,10) within the “always”.
Observe that the violation given in Figure 5 is almost
trivial. To avoid only generating such trivially falsifying
traces, we use the following strategy: (1) Use CMA-ES
solver instead of the Nelder-Mead method; (2) Apply a
difference metric criterion to select diverse falsifying traces;
(3) Accept traces with sub-optimal robustness violation.
Experimental results showed that the CMA-ES solver
produced more diverse input signals resulting in specification
violation than the simplex-based Nelder-Mead method [17].
(a) Green light specification: As δ increases, i.e. the HV is farther
from the intersection, the lower bound on velocity, ν , also increases;
therefore, if the HV is far away from the intersection, it should drive
fast. Furthermore, as τ , the lower bound on tel , increases, ν also
increases; therefore, after the traffic light turns green for some time,
all the through traffic should not move too slowly.
(b) Yellow light specification: If the HV is near the intersection,
i.e. δ0 is small, and it is traveling with a high speed, i.e. ν0 is
large, when the traffic light turns yellow and it is had enough time
to register this change, i.e. tel > 0.5, then in the following three
seconds, the HV will try to pass, i.e. its speed will never drop below
a high value of ν . On the other hand, when the vehicle is far away
and traveling slowly, i.e. δ0 is large and ν0 is small, then it will
decelerate in anticipation of the impending red light. Interestingly,
we can observe the transition from where ν changes from a high
to low value as a function of the distance to intersection and speed
at the time when the HV registered the light change. These results
are fairly intuitive.
(c) Red light specification: As δ decreases, the upper bound on
velocity, ν decreases, meaning vehicles tend to slow down when
close to the intersection; This trend is similar across all τ .
Fig. 4: Validity frontiers for traffic light specifications
The difference criterion involved checking that the Euclidean
distance between two candidate falsifying inputs was suffi-
ciently large to avoid repetition of the same signals. And
finally, accepting sub-optimal robustness violations allowed
for generating counterexamples closer to the expected bound-
ary between “human” and “non-human” behavior.
Using this strategy together with the falsification method
described previously, we found 170 falsifying traces for (2);
7,068 falsifying traces for (3); 21,784 falsifying traces for
(4); and 2,926 falsifying traces for (5). Note that additional
falsifying traces can be generated by increasing the maxi-
mum iterations allowed for the solver.
(a) A falsifying trace of the red
light specification
(b) Robust satisfaction along the
trace
Fig. 5: An example of falsification of the STL formula
φR(19.5,7.5,10)
D. Classification Results
In our initial treatment of the classification problem, we
construct individual classifiers for each state of the traffic
light to address the hybrid nature of this system. Furthermore,
we take measures to make the classification task more com-
putationally tractable by sub-sampling the training examples
and omitting the queue length (lq). Elimination of the queue
length from this initial analysis is justified for the green
traffic light state because the queue length is always zero;
additionally, our specification for the red traffic light does
not incorporate the queue length and consequently, the queue
length does not factor into deciding whether or not a trace
falsifies or satisfies the specification. Sub-sampling the traces
from 10 Hz to 2 Hz reduces the trace sizes by 5 times. The
number of sub-sampled traces (both positive and negative
traces) are 11,000 for sT L = G, and 6,000 for sT L = R.
An overview of the individual classifiers is given in the
following:
• Green traffic light classification: negative examples are
traces found to violate (3) and the features considered
are X(t) = [dx(t),vx(t), tel(t),u(t)]. For MLP classifiers,
the input to the classifier is a flattened sequence, ξ (t) =
[X(t − 3.0),X(t − 2.5), ...,X(t)] and the input to the
RNN classifier is the sequence of X(t).
• Red traffic light classification: negative examples are
traces found to violate (5). Since lq is not considered
in the spec, we omit it from this analysis. The resulting
features are X(t) = [d(t),v(t),Tel(t),a(t)]. Inputs to the
MLP and RNN classifiers are the same as those of the
green classifier.
Herein, we have only constructed classifiers for the green and
the red traffic lights, leaving treatment of the yellow light as
future work for the following reason: the duration of the
yellow light is short, and transitions between green/yellow
and yellow/red are important and can indeed take place
during the considered horizon. However, currently the neg-
ative training example are generated with a constant traffic
light state and thus the transitions themselves are not well
captured; furthermore, there are very few positive training
examples for a yellow traffic light.
The MLP is modeled with a dense layer with 28 hidden
units, ReLu activation, and soft-max function at the end of
the network. The RNN is modeled with a recurrent layer
containing 36 hidden units, ReLu activation, and soft-max
function at the end of the network. We used categorical cross
entropy as our loss function, and the ADAM optimizer.
Table II summarizes the (converged) accuracy of the two
classifiers when tested on a test set.
sT L = G sT L = R
MLP RNN MLP RNN
99.4 99.8 99.7 99.9
TABLE II: Comparison of MLP and RNN for different traffic
light states
We speculate that one reason for the extremely high
accuracy is that the classification was too easy or trivial
for much of the data. This indicates that perhaps the fal-
sified trajectories were too far away from the true boundary
between the “human” and “non-human” classes. Possible
rectifications to this issue are addressed in Section VI.
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: Examples of the resulting bound on HV acceleration
We examine the generated bound on HV acceleration for
some cases where the classifier was effective at reducing
uncertainty. Next, we briefly describe the querying process
for computing the the set of “human” accelerations given a
classifier. For a vector of states and inputs in the horizon,
ξ0 = [x(0),x(1), ...x(T ),u(0),u(1)...u(T −1)]T ,
we sweep the next input signal across the entire range of
acceleration to form {ui(T )},where i = 1,2,3...; each ui(T )
is used to complete a vector
ξ i0 = [ξ
T
0 ,ui(T )]
T .
Next, the ξ i0 are passed into the classifier. Finally, “human”
inputs are defined to be:
{ui(T ) | pH(ξ i0)≥ 0.5}.
In Figures 6a and 6b, we plot two 3-second traces ex-
tracted from human naturalistic driving data. For each trace,
the lower bound on next acceleration input u(T ) is estimated
using the querying routine above. The yellow circle marks
the estimated input based on the physical acceleration limit
of the HV, which is always−10 m/s2; the red circle marks the
estimated lower bound of acceleration from the classification
method, while the green circle shows the actual acceleration
undertaken by the HV. The proposed method shows a tighter
acceleration bound in comparison to physical limits in both
cases while remaining below the actual acceleration, i.e.
being conservative. In case (a), the HV is already moving at
a low speed, so it is intuitive that it will not suddenly conduct
full brake; in case (b), the HW is accelerating from a low
speed, so it is unlikely to suddenly brake at the next instant
as well. However, we also observed that the bound from
the proposed method is still very conservative, as braking
with acceleration around −5 m/s2 can be already perceived
as hard brake; moreover, the method does not always give
tighter bound than the physical limit.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we proposed a framework to construct a
data-driven bound on human driver behavior that allows for
verifying whether a given trajectory originates from a human
driver. Our results and contributions are summarized below:
• Generation of data-driven bounds on HV acceleration.
From the perspective of control synthesis, the benefit
of tighter bounds on human action is less uncertainty
about the disturbance.
• Synthesis of reasonable specifications for HV behavior.
• Generation of “non-human behavior” as falsifying traces
of STL formulae.
• Construction of classifiers to distinguish between human
and non-human driving traces.
This work is a first step in using falsification-based gen-
eration of negative training examples. Consequently, many
avenues should be explored to improve the performance of
the proposed framework. In particular, the classifier gave
useful results for some traces, but failed to restrict the bound
on human acceleration for many others. This is likely due to
the high dimensionality of the problem, since our approach
seeks to leverage information over a time horizon. Further-
more, only a subsets of the 556 trajectories were considered
for a given specification. Consequently, the training set may
be insufficient. Thus possible future approaches may include
seeking a larger data set or shortening the time horizon to
reduce problem dimensionality.
Additionally, negative training examples were generated
by considering piece-wise constant input signals, which often
featured large differences between constant segments. For
instance, an input signal could be constant at −6 m/s2 during
the [0,0.5) s interval before changing to 3 m/s2 during
the [0.5,1) s interval. However, HV accelerations do not
feature such excursions. Consequently, it is possible that
many of the generated negative training examples were very
far from positive training examples in the feature space
of the classification problem. Therefore, a well-performing
classifier may indeed find the boundary to be very close to
the negative training examples and as a result, deem many
actions that intuitively appear to be non-human as human.
A potential remedy that will be considered in future work is
attempt falsification using a class of smooth input signals and
again accept traces with sub-optimal robustness violations.
If the resulting negative training examples are closer to the
positive training examples in the feature space, then we can
expect a well-performing classifier to be more discerning
between human and non-human behavior. To address the risk
of potentially over-fitting to the observed data, the iterative
method introduced briefly in Section IV may be of value. The
core idea is to follow the procedure of Section IV to generate
a nominal classifier, and then sample this classifier near
its boundary points to augment the set of positive training
examples, X+, before repeating the procedure of Section
IV. By augmenting X+, we speculate that the parameter
synthesis method will find a larger feasible parameter domain
and consequently “push out” the classifier towards more
negative training examples.
In addition to reducing uncertainty by determining tighter
bounds on human action, it is also important to have a
notion of uncertainty quantification. A classifier based upon
convex programming principles can offer this quality through
the notion of an upper limit on the probability of a new
observation violating the constructed input bound [6], [18].
However, the approach of [6] considered stationary points
as opposed to the time series considered here, which add
additional complexity.
Finally, re-visiting the motivation of this work, we believe
our framework can be applied to the synthesis of safe &
optimal controllers and the identification of corner cases for
controller evaluation. The critical ingredient in achieving this
objective will be computing reachable sets using the state-
dependent disturbance bounds induced by our approach.
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